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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

ROY S. LUDLOW,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12981

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The record on appeal shows that on April 22, 1971,
Deputy Tom World filed a complaint in City Court
against the defendant Roy S. Ludlow for committing the
crime of obstructing an officer in the discharge of his
duty in violation of Title 76, Chapter 28, Section 54, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, (R. 69).
A preliminary hearing was held on November 4, 1971.
On January 6, 1972, defendant was bound over to District
Court for trial. On January 27, 1972, an information was
filed against defendant Ludlow by Jay E. Banks, Third
District Attorney, alleging that (sic) on or about the 22nd
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day of April, 1971, defendant did wilfully unlawfull
.
'
Y and
knowmgly, delay, obstruct and resist a deputy sheriff.
the discharge of his duty.
m
On February 10, defendant filed a Motion to Quash
Information with Third District Court Judge Wilkins, and
on March 27, 1972, Judge Wilkins handed down an order
quashing the information.
Plaintiff appeals from such Order.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
The issue in this case is a narrow one: Was there
sufficient legal and factual basis to support the District
Court's Order Quashing the Information in this case.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff asks this Court to vacate the Order of the
District Court quashing the information in this case and
remand the case for trial.
ARGUMENT
THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN THIS
CASE WAS IN ERROR.
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT'S OFFENSE AR 0 SE
FROM HIS REFUSAL TO PRESENT HIS
EMPLOYEE TO THE PROCESS SERVER

-3

SO THAT SERVICE OF PROCESS COULD
BE MADE.
POINT IL
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND AND
AMERICA PERMITS A PROCESS SERVER
TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY, OTHER
THAN PERSONAL DWELLINGS, TO SERVE
CIVIL PROCESS.
INTRODUCTION
Utah Code Annotated § 76-23-3 (1953), spells out
with particularity the grounds upon which an information
may be quashed. In the case before the Court, the information was quashed on the grounds that"... the common law of England and America does not afford the
right of a civil process server to enter onto the private
pl'operty of another for the purposes of serving the type
and kind of civil process involved in the instant case ..."
(R. 113).
The State will show in this brief that the District
Court's conclusion was in error for two reasons: first, the
offense was committed when the defendant refused to
produce his employee for the purpose of allowing a deputy
sheriff to serve civil process upon the employee; and second, the process server had the legal right to enter the
defendant's property to serve civil process as long as that
property was not a personal dwelling.
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POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT'S OFFENSE AROSE
FROM HIS REFUSAL TO PRESENT HIS
EMPLOYEE TO THE PROCESS SERVER
SO THAT SERVICE OF PROCESS COULD
BE MADE.
This court, in State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 ,
P. 2d 1060 (1955), clearly established the elements neces.
sary to prove the offense of obstructing officers in the
discharge of their duties (Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-54
(1953)). In that case, this Court said:
"In order to make out an offense under (Section
76-28-54) . . . it must appear that (A) a duly
constituted public officer (B) engaged in the performance of an official duty (C) was obstructed
or resisted by defendant." 286 P. 2d at 1062, 4
Ut. 2d at 71-2.
The District Court, Wilkins J., found that although
all three elements presented in Sandman were stated in
the information, the process server had no right to enter
the defendant's property to serve civil process and therefore the defendant's obstruction was not a criminal offense.
Counsel for defendant filed a lengthy memorandum, the
relevant portions of which alleged that the deputy's attempt to serve process was an unconstitutional search
and seizure and that no authority allowed such process
to be served on private property.
The State submits that the Court was in error in
granting the defendant's motion to quash the information.
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Clearly, a question of search and seizure is not involved in the instant case. At the preliminary hearing,
the State made a proffer of proof in which it was represented to the court that a duly authorized deputy sheriff
of Salt Lake County armed with valid civil process went
to the defendant's place of business and asked the defendant if he could see one of the defendant's employees so
that he might serve that process upon her. Defendant
refused to allow the deputy to see the employee (R. 15,
16).

It is the State's contention that the defendant's
offense lies not in his refusal to allow the deputy to search
through the premises of the factory for the employee,
although as will be presented later, the deputy had that
right, but the offense lies in the defendant-employer's refusal to present his employee to the officer. The defendant could have at least made an effort to determine (1)
if the person whose name appears on the process was indeed one of his employees; (2) if the employee was present on defendant's premises; and (3) if the employee
would see the officer so that service could be made. If
at that point, the employee would not see the officer and
the defendant had refused to allow the officer to seek out
the employee, we would then be confronted with the question of search and seizure, entry on private property and
the other arguments which prompted Judge Wilkins'
decision.
The State contends, howexer, that these other issues
need not be reached by this Court. The offense of ob-

....,..

I
I

stmcting consists of defendant's absolute refusal t
.
.
o pr0•
duce his employee or even mform his employee of th
officer's presence as presented in the information. Clearlye
the tht.'ee elements of Sandman are present and th e d'e.
fendant should be tried for the offense of obstructing ser.
vice of process. In 58 Am. Jur. 2d, OBSTRUCTING
JUSTICE, § 12, it is poL.1ted out that the term "obstruct"
in criminal statutes
" ... includes any passive, indirect, circuitous impediments to the service or execution of process '
such as hindering or preventing an officer by not
opening a door or removing an obstacle, or by con.
cealing or removing property."
1

The St2.te does not ask this Court to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant in this case. Such a
determination is the province of the trier of fact in the
lower court. The State merely asks this Court to vacate
the District Court's order quashing the information in
this case and to allow the State to put on its evidence.
The elements of the crime as delineated in Sandman are ,
clearly present in the information, and the order quashing
the information was therefore improper.
Defendant's motion to quash was based upon the
fact that the information "does not charge the defendant
with the commission of an offense" (R. 108). The infor·
mation states the elements necessary for the offense, (R.
107) and if the defendant has a defense, such defense
should be presented to the trier of fact. The State con·
tends, however, that an order quashing the infonnation

1
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in this case is improper when the grounds for such order
are th1t the information fails to make out an offense.

The ddendant further asserted in his Amended Order
to Quash I:iformation (R. 108) that " ... the information
contains a statement of matter which constitutes a legal
bar to the prosecution of th::: defendant", and he refers
specifically to the fact that " ... the information fails to
s::t fcdh that the deruty sheriff was acting under color
cf a lav,,rfully issued search warrant, and therefore the
information contains a statement of a matter which constitute:; a legal bar to prosecution ... ".
The defendant, however, fails to assert at any point
in the lower court proceedings that the deputy sheriff
needed to search warrant in order for the defendant to be
required to produce his employee so that process could
be served. The State's position is that the deputy did
not need a search warrant to seek out the employee, a
matter which will be dealt with in Point II of this brief,
and the State can see no reasoning which would require
a search warrant before an employer can be required to
at least inform his employee of the presence of an officer
or even produce the employee for the officer. The defendant at no time produced evidence or reasoning on this
particular point.
On the other hand, the defendant seemed preoccupied in the lower court proceedings with the concept that
"... the deputy sheriff sought to go beyond the business
office area of the defendant's plant, and into the privacy
of his working area ..." (R. 50). It is plaintiff's conten-
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tion that the offense took place in the business office area
of defendant's plant, where any member of the public ~
an invitee. The State presented no evidence which would
show that the deputy tried to go beyond the business area
or even desired to do so. Rather, such steps ne2d not have
been taken if the defendant would have at least asked
the employee if she would see the deputy. The defen.
dant's offense, as stated earlier, lies not in a refusal 1:o
allow the officer to search through his plant for the em.
ployee, but in his refusal to even inform the employee of
the officer's presence and/or produce the employee for the
officer.
Whether allegation of such conduct constitutes an
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-54 (1953), was
answered by this Court in State v. Sandman, supra, when
it said:
"Such interference or resistance need not be in the
form of physical force or violence, but it is suffi.
cient that there be some direct action amounting
to affirmative interference." 4 Utah 2d at 72, 286
P. 2d at 1062.
POINT II.
THE COI\1MON LAW OF ENGLAND AND
AMERICA PERMITS A PROCESS SERVER
TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY, OTHER
THAN PERSONAL DWELLINGS, TO SERVE
CIVIL PROCESS.

There is little question but what a process server,
attempting to serve civil process cannot enter a personal
dwelling with or without a search warrant. For that reason, Utah law allows service of civil process "... by leavinG" a copy of (the person's) usual place of abode with
some person of suitable age and discretion there residing
... " UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, RULE 4(e) (1) (1953).
iv1ost of the defendant's argument in the lower court
proceedings revolve around the failure of the information
to all2ge that the deputy acted under color of a search
wanant. The argument is ludicrous, simply because an
examination of Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-2 (1953), reveals
that search warrants may be issued only when a public
offense is involved and not in a civil situation.
The questions then, is not whether a search warrant
was required in the instant case, but whether a deputy
can go upon private property other than a personal dwelling to serve civil process. As stated previously, the State
does not quarrel with the defendant's arguments that a
process server cannot enter a dwelling to serve civil process, however, the State does urge that when private property other than a dwelling is involved the process server
has every right to enter reasonably and peaceably to serve
process.
Statutory authority for this concept is provided by
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953), which provides:

10
"The common law of England so far as it ·
n· .
18 not
.
repugnan t to '. or m con ict \V1th, the Constitution
laws o.f this State, and so far only as it is con.
s~tent d""'.1t~h andfadhisapted to the natural and physi.
c con I 10ns o t "' state and the nece:cc:ities of
the people her~f is. hereby adopted, and shnll be
the rule of dec1s1on m all courts of this state.'

o:

The State contends that the common law of both
England and America permit a process server to enter
upon property other than a dwelling to serve civil process.
The defendant's authorities, presented to the District
Court in memoranda, primarily go to the point that a
process server cannot enter a dwelling house to serve civil
process. The few cases concerning businesses relate to
inspection and regulatory procedures from which criminal
complaints could arise. e.g. See v. Seattle, (R. 37). Such
is not the situation in the instant case. The defendant
presumably was not opening himself up to prosecution by
presenting the employee to the officer, nor would he have
done so if he had allowed the officer to find the employee.
The State admits public policy dictates that where
possible criminal violations are involved, greater safe·
guards are necessary; but where, as in the instant case,
no criminal violations could presumably be involved, public policy should dictate that an individual cannot, on
property other than dwellings, obstruct an officer in the
performance of his duty.
Such policy was indeed the common law of England.
In 57 A. L. R. 220, it is pointed out that:
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"The privilege which the law allows to a man's
habitation, and which precludes the sheriff from
entering, unless the outer door is open, either to
arrest the man or to take his goods on execution,
does not extend to a store or barn disconnected
from the dwelling house, and forming no part of
the curtilage. (Citing cases.) "
In Hodder v. Williams, 2 Q. B. (ENG.) 663, it was
held that: "A sheriff, for the purpose of levying
under a writ of fieri facias, may break open the
outer door of a workshop or other building of the
judgment debtor, not being his dwelling house or
connected therewith." Reported at 57 A. L. R. 221.
The C'.)mmon law of America appears to have developed al-:mg the saa'.e lines in this area as has the common law of England. In Platt v. Brown, XVI PICK. 553
(MASS.) (1835), the sheriff attempted to serve civil process, i.e. writ of attachment, on goods in the possession
of a third person. The Court upheld the sheriff's right
to enter the warehouses in which the third person's goods
were stored and attach the goods by taking possession of
them. XVI PICK. at 554.
Although later case law relating to the specific point
in question appears to be lacking, there is little doubt
that the common law of both England and America permit an officer in the discharge of his duties to enter premises other than a dwelling to serve civil process. The
rationale is as valid today as it was in earlier times. Where
civil process is involved, public policy requires that no
individual, or goods as the case may be, should be able
to avoid execution of process. In the case of personal service at a person's place of abode, substituted service is
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available by law; but where an individual is else h
.
.
.
Were
than m a dwellmg, substituted service is not available
and the law must have some manner of serving civil pro.
cess in that situation. The common law, adopted in Utah
by § 68-3-1, provides such manner of serving civil process
and an information alleging the obstruction of such ser'.
vice is valid for it clearly makes out an offense as provided
in § 76-28-54.
The AmeriC.'.1ll Law Institute, which provides for mod.
em codification of the common law through its Rest.ate.
ment Series, has drawn the same conclusions as presented
by the plaintiff in this case. In Restatement of Torts
'
Second, Section 209, the American Law Institute has
codified the common law of England and America as presented in this Part:
"§ 209.

ENTRY TO EXECUTE CIVIL PROCESS AGAINST NONOCCUPANT OF
LAND

(1) The privilege to execute civil process pursu- 1
ant to a writ which is either valid or fair on its
face carries with it the privilege to enter land in
the possession of another, for the purpose of exe· .
cuting such process against the person or g~ds of
a third person not an occupant of the land, if the
person or goods subject to process are on the land
or the possessor of the land has led the actor rea·
sonably to believe that such is the case."
The Restatement would modify the common law only ro
the extent that an actor is not privileged to break and
enter a dwelling except in certain proscribed circum·
stances which even the common law did not recognize.

1
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CONCLUSION
The State would again reiterate that it is not the
province of this Court or the District Court on a Motion
to Quash Information, to determine the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. Plaintiff merely asks this Court to
reverse the decision of the Di.strict Court by finding that
the information below specified the commission of an
offense and made no statement which would be a legal
bar to prosecution, thereby allowing the people of the
State of Utah a fair hearing as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
CARL J. NEMELKA
County Attorney
DONALD SAWAYA
Deputy County Attorney
LARRY R. KELLER
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant

